We present a two-step approach of assessing whether major donors of foreign aid have met recent demands for less proliferated and better coordinated aid efforts. 
Introduction
Aid proliferation, donor fragmentation and lack of coordination have been identified for decades as serious problems impairing aid effectiveness (Bigsten 2006) . For instance, Whittington and Calhoun (1988: 296) argued more than 20 years ago that uncoordinated aid is "at least partly responsible for the failure of African economies to utilize their development assistance effectively." The World Bank (1984) claimed that "the weaknesses of uncoordinated aid" were increasingly recognized by both recipient and donor countries.
However, the sequence of similar political declarations until recently, culminating in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005, rather suggests that little has changed in day-to-day practice of aid delivery.
On the other hand, there might be less need for donor coordination than all these declarations make us believe. Dollar and Levin (2006) found an increasing selectivity of aid, which may imply that donors specialize unilaterally by serving only a sub-set of eligible countries. Donors may also decide unilaterally to focus on specific purposes aid is meant to serve such as aid for education ("aid sectors"). Unilateral action of this sort would help overcome coordination failure -but only if donors concentrated on different recipient countries and aid sectors, rather than all engaging with the same "aid darlings" and crowding in the same high-publicity sectors.
Hence, the present paper presents a two-step approach of assessing whether donors have improved aid effectiveness by specialization and coordination (see Section 3). In the first step, we calculate Theil indices to evaluate whether major donors, viewed as independent actors, have reduced aid proliferation and fragmentation by concentrating in selected recipient countries and specializing in selected aid sectors. In the second step, we employ overlap indices to analyze to which extent donors coordinate their aid efforts. The two-step approach represents a major extension of the previous literature. As will be shown in Section 2, earlier studies typically consider either the first or the second issue in isolation from the other.
Furthermore, in contrast to almost all previous studies, we use disaggregated sector-specific aid data. We also offer new insights by taking the time dimension into account.
Our results, presented in Section 4, point to a wide and persistent gap between the rhetoric of political declarations and the donors' actual aid allocation during the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Few donors have specialized on a limited set of recipients and aid sectors, and donor coordination has remained elusive.
Previous Literature
It is widely accepted that the effectiveness of aid could be enhanced if donors specialized and coordinated more than they have done in the past. Specialization might counteract aid proliferation and donor fragmentation which tend to increase aid-related transaction costs.
According to the World Bank (2004: 206) , there are often "too many projects for any to work efficiently." Proliferation and fragmentation impose high transaction costs on the recipient countries, especially the poorest among them, with multiple donor missions, different sets of policy conditions and inconsistent reporting requirements absorbing scarce administrative resources (Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima and Moore 2006) . 1 At the same time, donors are often "poaching" qualified local labour.
Applying a game-theoretic framework, Roodman (2006b) argues that if there are multiple donors who care most about the success of their own projects, a negative externality arises through competition for scarce recipient resources. Based on a model that incorporates aid and recurrent costs to produce aid project outcome, Arimoto and Kono (2009) conclude that with an increasing number of aid projects the amount of recurrent cost allocated to each project will be reduced. This tends to lower aid productivity because aid projects can only produce sustained benefits if there is no shortage of recurrent costs. Knack and Rahman (2007) show, both theoretically and empirically, that aid fragmentation impairs bureaucratic quality in high-aid countries. For a broad cross-section of aid recipients, Kimura, Sawada and Mori (2007) find a negative impact of fragmentation on economic growth.
Less fragmented aid may also alleviate collective action problems by providing a single or dominant donor with stronger incentives to accept responsibility for success or failure of aid delivery in a particular sector to a particular recipient country. Responsibility is rather diffused when there are many donors involved, giving incentives "for any one donor to shirk on activities that maximize overall development in favour of activities that contribute to donor-specific goals" (Knack and Rahman 2007: 177 Engel and Keijzer (2008) for recent initiatives at donor harmonization at the EU level. 7 Similar to the litany of political declarations in multilateral fora, the formation of donor groups at the country level may not really help overcome coordination failure. See AFRODAD (2007: 22) on the HAC donor group in Kenya (HAC stands for harmonization, alignment and coordination): the group has "produced documents on partnership principles, ToR for lead donors in the sectors, and ToR for joint assistance strategy." 8 Sector-wide approaches are supposed to enhance donor coordination at the sector level, with donors pooling resources for projects within a specific sector such as education. 9 According to OECD aid statistics, multilateral aid accounted for 28 percent of total net disbursements by all DAC countries in 1972 DAC countries in -1975  In the following, we attempt to overcome several flaws characterizing most of this literature. Most importantly, none of the previous studies distinguishes between donor specialization and donor coordination. Furthermore, almost all of them use aggregate aid figures, even though specialization and coordination are not necessarily restricted to the level of recipient countries. Finally, there is clearly a lack of studies assessing specialization and coordination both across major donors and over time.
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Data and Approach
As noted above, we follow a two-step approach starting with an assessment of donor-specific efforts at specialization and concentration and then turning to the question of whether such moves, if any, were taken in a coordinated manner.
As for donor-specific specialization, we draw on standard measures of concentration. FrTh makes use of both dimensions, recipient countries and aid sectors, but it can be "decomposed" to assess whether, say, less fragmentation of aid from donor j (over time or relative to other donors) is due to concentration on fewer recipient countries and/ or a stronger focus on selected aid sectors.
To assess the degree of donor coordination, we refer to the earlier literature on the measurement of intra-industry trade (Grubel and Lloyd 1971) . So-called trade overlaps have often been used to assess the empirical relevance of intra-industry trade. Accordingly, "a dollar's worth of exports is 'overlapped' if there is a corresponding dollar's worth of imports in the same … commodity group" (Finger 1975: 585) . For any country j, the trade overlap (TO j ) can thus be calculated as follows:
with X and M representing exports and imports in industries s. This index varies from 0 in the case of no overlap to 1 in the case of complete overlap; an index value of zero would obviously result when the country reports either exports or imports in any industry, and never both in the same industry. Essentially the same concept has been used to calculate the trade overlap between different trading partners of country j (e.g., IRELA 1997). Replacing X s and M s above by the exports of trading partners i in industries s to country j (as a share of total exports of i to j), the index would reveal a complete overlap if the trading partners had exactly the same export structure.
In the following, we compare the structure of aid from different donor countries, rather than the export structure of trading partners. The underlying assumption is that the "aid overlap" should be considerably less than one, and declining over time, for donors who avoided a duplication of aid activities and increasingly engaged in coordinated aid allocation.
In contrast to the simple trade overlap measure described before, we consider several dimensions in which the aid activities of different donors may overlap. The first dimension relates to the recipient countries i receiving aid from donor countries j. In this way, we capture the possibility that coordination may take the form of each donor engaging in a different subset of recipient countries. The second dimension concerns the aid sectors s. For instance, two donors may engage in the same recipient country and still provide coordinated aid if one donor focussed on aid for education and the other one on aid for clean water and sanitation.
11
Combining the two dimensions of recipient countries and aid sectors, the index of aid overlap (I) or, respectively, the degree of donor coordination (C) between donors j1 and j2 at time t can be calculated as follows:
i,s defined as before.
We consider the five largest donor countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), i.e., France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.
In addition, we include four DAC countries that are widely supposed to be like-minded donors (Neumayer 2003) in terms of providing well targeted aid, i.e., Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The European Commission (EC) serves as a benchmark to assess the coordination efforts of bilateral donor countries.
All aid data are taken from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System, an online database providing detailed information on aid commitments (http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx? DatasetCode=CRSNEW). We prefer commitment data over actual disbursements of aid as donors have full control over commitments only (Neumayer 2003) . 13 Although the data series go back as far as 1973, we restrict our analysis to the period 1995-2006. This is because
underreporting by donors appears to be widespread in earlier years. 14 To account for the fact that aid allocations exhibit large year-to-year fluctuations, we average commitments over the sub-periods 1995-1998, 1999-2002 and 2003-2006 before calculating Theil and overlap 11 Similarly, Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima and Moore (2006: 8) mention two distinct kinds of proliferation, source proliferation and use proliferation; the latter is defined as "the division of aid among a wide variety of end uses in-country", coming close to the sector perspective we apply in the present paper. However, Acharya et al. use aggregate aid data, assuming that source proliferation is a good measure of proliferation in a broader sense. 12 By assuming that more overlap means less coordination, we miss another possible form in which donors may cooperate, namely by co-financing SWAps and funding common baskets managed by one lead donor. The data situation does not allow assessing exactly to what extent these instruments have actually helped aid coordination. Bigsten (2006) notes, however, that progress with respect to pooling donor resources and agreeing on lead agencies and silent partners has been rather slow. 13 By contrast, Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima and Moore (2006) use aid disbursements, but they argue from the point of view of recipients rather than taking the donor perspective as we do. 14 We consider a disproportionately low number of positive entries in the aid data base as a straightforward indication of underreporting. According to this criterion, some donors (France 1995 (France -1997 Germany 1995 Germany -1998 United States 1995 -1998 
Aid proliferation
Columns (1) of Table 1 Table 2 , and at the same time exhibits a low overall Theil index. On the other hand, France and Japan resemble the EC and Germany in covering almost all recipient countriesand yet aid from the former two donors is clearly less proliferated than aid from the latter two donors. Over time, Japan delivered aid to a rising number of recipients without a 15 For the present purpose of assessing donor specialization and coordination, it appears to be most reasonable to refer to aid sectors such as education, rather than sub-sectors such as primary education. By contrast, Roodman (2006a) measures aid proliferation at the (most detailed) project level. Note, however, that Roodman focuses on aid-related transaction costs. Transaction costs might still be high if donors specialized in specific sectors, but continued to fund a large number of small projects. 16 In 1999-2002, Germany had the highest Theil index among the donor countries considered here, which is in accordance with the ranking based on aid disbursements in Acharya et al. (2006) , where Germany also comes first when taking averages over the period 1999-2001. corresponding rise in the composite Theil index, while France continuously served almost all recipients and still has become more focussed in terms of the composite Theil index. The Netherlands, and recently also the United Kingdom, stand out in that they have become more selective at the eligibility stage.
The pattern of Theil indices across recipient countries (columns (2) in Table 1) changes somewhat compared to the composite pattern. Looking at the most recent sub-period, the United States, for example, moves up in the ranking when only the country dimension is considered, whereas France does not remain among the top performers. In the present context, it appears to be more important to note that, when only considering the recipient country dimension, there is still less compelling evidence for an increasing donor concentration than for the composite Theil index. The average Theil index for all ten donors in columns (2) declines by just 0.04 points from 3.63 in 1995-1998 to 3.59 in 2003-2006, compared to a corresponding decline by 0.18 points in columns (1).
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As concerns the sectoral dimension of aid proliferation, the most striking result is that all donors are active in almost all sectors. This applies throughout the period of observation (columns (3) of Table 2 ). Yet, there are notable differences across donors, as well as some changes over time, with respect to the Theil indices based on sector-specific aid to all recipient countries taken together (columns (3) in Table 1 ). Aid proliferation across sectors is found to be strongest in the United States. Surprisingly, Denmark ranks second, reinforcing the conclusion that Denmark's favourable position in the overall ranking is largely because it selects fewer recipient countries at the eligibility stage. At the opposite end, France stands out as the donor with the highest sectoral concentration of aid, followed by Japan and Germany.
France also shows the clearest trend towards less proliferation across aid sectors, the United Kingdom being the only other donor where the Theil index based on sector-specific aid moves markedly downwards.
To test for significant differences in the distributions of aid shares underlying the Theil indices we performed two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests. Results are shown in Table 3 , while Graphs 1 and 2 portray the cumulative distribution of aid shares for two selected donor countries (United States and France), comparing the sub-periods 2003-2006 and 1995-1998. 18 We focus on comparing the distributions over time as we are particularly interested in changes in proliferation and concentration of the donors under consideration.
Performing the K-S tests for aid shares along both dimensions, recipient countries and aid 17 Note also that the average Theil value of 3.59 in column (2) is just 28 percent below the maximum value of 4.96 (ln 142), compared to a distance of 37 percent between the average Theil value of 5.09 in column (1) and the maximum value of 8.13. 18 A complete set of graphs is available from the authors on request.
sectors, typically results in statistically different distributions (columns (1) of Table 3 ). The major exception is Denmark for which none of the inter-period distributions differs significantly. 19 The rejection of the hypothesis of equality of distribution along both aid dimensions may be most surprising in cases such as the United States where the cumulative aid shares deviate only in minor parts of the distribution (Graph 1a) and the composite Theil index remains almost the same.
On the contrary, the K-S test results based on total aid along the recipient country dimension provide overwhelming support for the hypothesis of equality of distributions behind the Theil indices (columns (2) of Table 3 ). This underscores the earlier conclusion that Finally, we report two robustness tests in Table A1 . We exclude either China, India and Indonesia or all upper middle-income countries. 20 The exclusion of the former three recipients is to account for possible biases resulting from the largest sample countries receiving exceptionally high aid shares. Limiting the sample to low-and lower middleincome countries may reveal the extent to which donor rankings as well as changes over time are "only" due to selectivity with regard to relatively advanced recipient countries. However, the overall picture on sector-specific aid to particular recipient countries is largely as before.
As for the ranking of donors, aid from the United Kingdom, France, Japan and Denmark 
Aid Coordination
Arguably, donor specialization is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for better coordinated aid efforts. Hence, the weak evidence pointing to less aid proliferation and more concentration by individual donors bodes not well for coordination among the most important donors. Indeed, the overlap indices summarized in Tables 4 and 5 Denmark is the only exception).
One might object that bilateral aid coordination was unlikely to improve considerably as many of the overlaps reported in Table 4 appear to be fairly low from the outset. The average of all bilateral overlaps in 1995-1998 amounts to 0.18. While this is far below the maximum overlap of "one", the relatively low level of overlaps is largely because aid is disaggregated according to recipient countries and aid sectors simultaneously. 22 Note that even the overlaps of similarly disaggregated aid by one particular donor at different points in time remain substantially below "one". Actually, when comparing the distribution of sectorspecific aid between different sub-periods, the overlaps rarely exceed 0.5 for any of the ten donors considered here.
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The average level of overlaps increases considerably when using less disaggregated aid data, but the central message remains the same: We do not find evidence for improved donor coordination. Table 5 presents overlap indices also for aid distributions along either the dimension of recipient countries or the dimension of aid sectors. The donor-specific entries in Table 5 represent the average of the nine overlaps with all other donors.
The first three columns of Table 5 reveal that the decline in overall coordination is mainly due to increasing overlaps involving the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden 21 In seven of these cases, Denmark is involved in pairs with (almost) unchanged aid overlaps. 22 Similarly, it has been shown in the literature on intra-industry trade that the evidence weakens with finer levels of disaggregation; see Sharma (2000) and the references given there. Analogously to Section 4.1, we perform two robustness tests for the overlap indices, summarized in Table A2 . The robustness of these indices is quite remarkable: Neither the exclusion of the largest sample countries nor dropping all upper-middle income countries alters the main conclusions drawn above for the degree of aid coordination. In fact, average overlaps for all ten donors are almost unchanged. As concerns the donor-specific overlaps, less than ten percent of all index values reported in Table A2 deviate by more than 0.01 points from the corresponding index values in Table 5 .
Summary
Aid proliferation, donor fragmentation and the lack of coordination are not new phenomena.
All have been widely identified as serious problems that can eventually render aid efforts ineffective. This recognition by both donors and recipients was accompanied by political declarations that, nonetheless, do not seem to have had the desired impact on the actual allocation of aid by donor countries.
We follow a two-step approach in order to assess donor specialization and coordination efforts, based on sector-specific aid data and covering the period 1995-2006.
First, we evaluate whether the aid of major donors has become less proliferated over time, by concentrating in selected recipient countries and/or by specializing in selected aid sectors.
Second, we employ overlap indices borrowed from the literature on intra-industry trade to analyze the degree of donor coordination. This represents a significant extension of previous studies that are mostly restricted to either aid proliferation or donor coordination and typically employ highly aggregated aid data.
The evidence on aid proliferation does not reveal a trend towards more concentrated aid, except for France and the Netherlands. Comparing aid proliferation across donors, the ranking differs markedly from rankings based on indicators relating to altruistic or selfish aid 13 motivations. Though often berated as selfish donors, France and Japan turn out to be among the weakest proliferators, while Norway -widely believed to be a superior donor -is a strong proliferator.
Even less favourable conclusions emerge from the analysis of aid overlap indices. The evidence points to a persistent lack of coordination in the aid efforts of major donors. Notably the largest donor, the United States, shows a systematic decrease in the degree of aid coordination. The results on aid proliferation as well as donor coordination are robust to changes in the sample of recipient countries. Overall, our findings are in serious conflict with political manifestations that make us believe that aid has become less proliferated and more coordinated. To the contrary, the gap between the words and deeds of major donors appears to be as wide as ever. a Columns (1): sector-specific aid to particular recipient countries; total of 3408 (zero and positive) observations. Columns (2): total aid to particular recipient countries; total of 142 (zero and positive) observations. Columns (3): sector-specific aid to all recipient countries; total of 24 (zero and positive) observations. 
